Croatian journalists’ narratives on Croatian war crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina by Erjavec, Karmen & Volcic, Zala
Karmen Erjavec and Zala Volcic 2
Abstract: The former Yugoslav wars of 1990s have proven to
be one of the most violent and aggressive military conflicts after the
2nd World War in Europe. One of the wars in the former Yugoslav
region took place between Croats and Bosnian Muslims (1992-
1994). The causes for war and war itself are still being denied by
the majority of Croats despite evidence from Croatian historians
and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in
The Hague. Because the media have played a crucial role in the
construction of the ethnic “Other” (the enemy), we’ve interviewed
Croatian journalists to understand how they understand, explain
and justify the war crimes committed in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The
study shows that Croatian journalists appropriated “war on terrorism”,
“Iraqi war”, “European” and “neo-liberal” discourses according to
their own socio-historical framework to justify a particular ideology
(in this case, the nationalistic ideology of a “Greater Croatia”) and a
particular practice (the war crimes against the Bosnian Muslims).
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1. Introduction
The majority of researchers that analyze the after-wars peace-processes in
former Yugoslavia share an agreement (eg. Bilandzic, 2006; Galtung, 2002;
Kurspahic, 2003; Lampe, 1996; MacDonald, 2002; Samary, 1995; Woodward,
1995) that the Dayton Peace Agreement was imposed by the International
community, while especially promoted and advocated by USA. The Agreement
has laid the foundations for creating a “non-peace and non-war” troublesome
situation and has not solved the essential national and religious antagonisms in
Bosnia. In particular, the scholars argue that one of the main conditions of
peace-building and peace-keeping processes is the ability to reconcile, and further,
to acknowledge war crimes committed by one’s own military. If Croatian public
has by now acknowledged the war crimes against the Serbs in Croatia, it has also
defined them as war crimes committed by individual perpetrators (Kajzer, 2006,
p. 4). However, in the case of the crimes committed by the Croatian Army against
Bosniak 2 civilians during the war in 1992-1995, there is still no political formal
acknowledgement of Croatia’s responsibility in those massacres that have taken
place in Bosnia. That comes in spite of the fact of clear evidence of Croatian
army’s crimes that was put forward by International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia in the Hague, and further acknowledged by Croatian historians
themselves (eg. Bilandzic, 2006; Kurspahic, 2003). In July 2006, the opinion
polls showed that the Croatian public was split about this issue: 41 per cent of
Croats believed that the Croatian Army committed war crimes in Bosnian war,
while 59 per cent argued that Croatia was not involved in Bosnian war at all
(Kajzer, 2006, p. 4).
Because the Croatian mainstream media have played an important role in
spreading nationalistic propaganda (Thompson, 1995; Skopljanac Brunner et al.,
2000) and continue to play a role in the reproduction of nationalisms (Erjavec
& Volcic, 2006), our intention here is not to present yet another study of
media’s negligence of war crimes, but go one step further and focus on how
news producers of leading media themselves, i.e. Croatian journalists, talk about
the war crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina and whether and how they reproduce
nationalisms. Therefore, in the summer and fall of 2006 we’ve conducted in-
depth interviews with Croatian journalists in order to find out how they’ve dealt
with traumatic events of the past, i.e. the war crimes.
In short, the main goal of this paper is to show how Croatian journalists
borrow and appropriate different global discourses to legitimate Croatian army’s
war crimes of Bosniaks civilians. We unpack and analyze how journalists employ,
borrow and appropriate different current global discourses to make sense out of
Croatian nationalistic discourse 3 and war crimes in BiH. We draw here on
Fairclough’s theory of a recontextualisation. Recontextualisation is understood
here as not only a representation of social events but as the appropriation of
discourse. Thus, we try to present an example of a study that uncovers
recontextualisation strategies used by the informants to make sense and to
justify a specific ideology (in our case, the nationalistic ideology of ‘Greater
Croatia’) and specific practice (in our case, war crimes against the Bosniaks).
 The political-historical context of the former Yugoslavia
During the 1980s, after the death of its president Josip Broz Tito in 1980,
the suppressed nationalisms conquered the social spheres of the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). Both major ethnic groups, Serbs and Croats, claimed
2 A member of the Muslim ethnic
national community is called a Bosnjak
(Bosniak) as distinct from Bosanac
(Bosnian), which refers to a citizen of
Bosniain general.
3 Nationalist ic discourse here
generally denotes those practices that
create the objects of which they speak
of. We define nationalistic discourse
here as all those discursive practices and
articulations that on the first level of an
identity creation advocate a superiority
of belonging to a nation. We understand
national identity as involving both, self-
awareness of the group and awareness
of outside and inside ‘Others’from
which the nation wants to differentiate
itself. Nation looks both inward, in order
to unify itself, and outward, to divide
itself f rom others .  These social ly
constructed entities that nations are
create cohesive identities through
exclusionary nation
alistic discourses that invoke common
and unif ied cultural codes and
to have been the victims of a continued persecution of the other, who, they
claimed, dominated the SFRY.
The question as to what extent the idea of a former Yugoslav identity was
accepted by country’s populace during the period of 1945-1991 remains. One
answer can be found in surveys on the expression of Yugoslav and national
belonging. In BiH a mixture of three ethnic groups-43.7 per cent Muslim, 31.3
per cent Serb, 17.3 per cent Croat, 7.7 per cent ‘Yugoslav’ and ‘Other’ (Statistics
Bulletin, 1991) – was particularly vulnerable to the nationalistic tensions in the
region. The pressure mounted on Bosnian Serbs and Croats to follow the ‘sacred
nation cause’ as Belgrade (Serbia) called for ‘all Serbs in a single state’ and
Zagreb (Croatia) promoted Tudjman’s Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) as the
‘planetary party of all Croats’ (MacDonald, 2002, p. 123). In November, 1990,
during BiH’s first free, multi-party elections the three most nationalist parties won
and were immediately engaged in endless nationalistic quarrels.
In June 1991, the war in Slovenia first started (YU army/Serb forces trying to
prevent the country’s indepence), and later, in Croatia, Serbian irregulars instigated
violent clashes with Croatian paramilitary forces. In April 1992, the fighting
spread from Croatian Eastern Slavonia to Krajina and to BiH. Generally, the
former Yugoslav wars were a consequence of competing rights for national self-
determinations in areas of nationally-mixed population. In this sense, it’s important
to stress that we understand all nationalisms in the lands of former Yugoslavia as
equally dangerous and destructive (Volcic, 2006).
Serbs and Croats alike were exploiting their own pasts in order to present
themselves as the victims. However, political elites in both states agreed on one
issue – BiH – and on the question as of how to divide the Bosnian territory. ‘Ironically,
while a brutal Serbo-Croatian war raged, the two sides had reached a mutual
understanding on plans to carve up ‘Serbian’ and ‘Croatian’ territories in BiH during
the Milosevic-Tudjman talks in the spring of 1991’ (Kurspahic, 2003, p. 97).
Importantly, both sides alike have committed war crimes, which included
‘ethnic cleansing’ (using terror to force people from the villages where their
families had lives centuries), establishment of concentration camps 4 (where
victims were beaten, torture, raped and often killed), destruction of physical
property (including destruction of approximately 1,4000 mosques), and numerous
massacres of civilian population (200,000 deaths) (Samary, 1995; Woodward,
1995; Lampe, 1996). ‘Tudjman and the Croatian armed forces supported the
Bosnian Croats against the Bosnian Serbs, then a few months latter also against
Bosniaks’ (Razsa and Lindstrom, 2004, p. 633) and  ‘some of the most gruesome
scenes of the Serbs campaign of ‘ethnic cleansing’ were played in ‘Croats’ territories,’
with the massacre of more than a hundred Bosniak civilians in Ahmici village in
Central Bosnia on April 16, 1993, and with Bosniaks from Mostar, Capljina, and
Stolac herded to concentration camps in Heliodrom, Dretelj’ (Kurspahic, 2003,
p. 128) and elsewhere (e.g. Vitez and Vare) latter in 1993 (Divjak, 2001, p. 136).
And in both countries, the mainstream representations positioned Bosniaks as
little more than an empty, invented and artificial nation with no historical claims
to the BiH territory. For Croats and Serbs alike, the Muslims were the harbingers of
a dangerous Islamic conspiracy, poised to take over the Balkans and the Western
Europe (MacDonald, 2002, p. 9). ‘Serbian and Croatian leaders both argued that
Bosniaks were fallen members of their own nation, who had been forced to
abandon their true identity after Ottoman invasion. Military leaders argued that
they were simply ‘liberating’ parts of their ethnic homeland that had long been
submerged under foreign rule, while ‘freeing’ Muslims from their artificial
attachments’ (ibid., p. 222).
experiences.
4 Tudjman publicly admitted to the
existence of Croatian ‘collection
centres, which house, by 1993, an
estimated 20,000 inmates in the
In February 1994, the Clinton Administration issued an ultimatum to the
Croatian government: either it removes its regular armed forces from BiH and
renounces its ideas of a Croatian state within BiH or it faces a complete isolation.
That very same year, the Croats and Bosniaks signed a non-aggression and common
federation treaty in Washington, D.C. (Silber and Little, 1995, p. 353). On December
14 1995, following over three years of bloody conflict, the Dayton Peace Agreement
brought an end to the Bosnian war. While claiming its objective to be democracy,
and ethnic pluralism, the Agreement, as the critics point out, legalized the ethnic
partition between Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats, and Bosniaks. Bosnia-Herzegovina
was divided into two entities: the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (with 51 per
cent of the territory) inhabited mostly by Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats, and the
Republic of Serbia (with 49 per cent of the territory) populated almost exclusively
by Bosnian Serbs. Furthermore, the Agreement separated the Federation of BiH
into ten ethnically distinct cantons with very little intermixing between the two
ethnic groups.  Although fighting ceased in 1995, the conflict is not entirely
resolved. Ethnic fragmentation and ‘uncertain transitions’ from socialism to
democracy have contributed to the country’s current situation of economic,
social, and political suspension (Verdery & Burawoy, 1999, p. 188). Today, eleven
years after the last military struggles in BiH, the international control over military
forces is still present and it is the international community, which imposes
controls and negotiates the peace in BiH. Furthermore, there are still conflicting
visions of the BiH future. In 2005, Croatia began the EU accession negotiations;
Serbia is due to start them when it arrests and surrenders the war crime suspect
Ratko Mladic to the ICTFY.
2. Critical discourse analysis approach
In this study, we attempt to expand Fairclough’s definition of
recontextualisation as a representation of social events. Recontextualisation is
understood here as the appropriation of discourse. In this case for instance, we
refer to recontextualisation relations between the ‘global’ scale and the national/
local scale and between the present and the past. We analyze how specific
discourse about the war crimes is decontextulized and recontextualized, and thus
gains new meanings. It is important to note here that local appropriation of the
traumatic past to global political discourses occurs in accordance with specific
local ideology. In this case, the Croatian journalists’ discourse about war crimes
in BiH is based on the dominant nationalistic ideology. Thus, we try to present
an example of a study that uncovers recontextualisation used by the informants
to legitimization and justification of war crimes.
In her recent study, Wodak (2006, p. 136) identifies numerous strategies
employed by the visitors of the German Wehrmacht exhibition that focused
on the war crimes committed by German soldiers and their dealing with the
traumatic past. Shortly, these are: a) denying that war crimes happened at all, b)
negating the context itself (refusals to deal with the issue at all; claiming ignorance
and victim-hood of oneself), c) using strategy of scientific rationalization, d)
creating ‘positive self-representation’, e) attempting to understand, and f) justifying
or denying the war crimes: relativizing (‘Every war is horrible.’), providing a (pseudo-
)rational causal explanation (‘Other forced us.’), the army was responsible (‘I
only did my duty.’), acknowledging the crimes, but attributing them to other units.
We focus on strategies of justification and legitimization discourses of war crimes,
because our main target group are those who do not deny that war crimes were
committed. We want to go beyond the before-mentioned general justification
strategies, and analyse what kind of discourses were employed by our informants,
journalists themselves. The linguistic analysis of the in-depth interviews was
performed on four ‘levels’: analysis of the macro-proposition, linguistic strategies,
choice of keywords, and representation of social actors.
The semantics of discourse deals with meanings in terms of ‘propositions’
(Brown & Yule, 1983). According to Van Dijk (1988), propositions are the
smallest independent constructs of language and thought, typically expressed by
single sentence or clause. On the basis of propositions, Van Dijk (1988) introduces
the analysis of thematic organization of the news. This hierarchical structure
consists of (macro-) propositions that define the most important or relevant
pieces of information in the text. Semantic macrostructure is derived from local
meanings of words by macro-rules, such as deletion, generalization and
construction. Such rules have omitted irrelevant details, connecting the essence
on a higher level into abstract meanings or constructing different meaning
constituents in higher-level events or social concepts. In this study, a proposition
is defined as an ‘idea unit’ in the form of a single sentence, several sentences, a
paragraph or whole story. However, a proposition is a unit only for the convenience
of comparison. The analysis of a type of macro-semantics, which deals with
global meanings and enables the description of the meanings of in-depth interview,
will be presented.
The analysis presented below focuses on the notion ‘linguistic strategy’,
which is identified in terms of ‘planned social (in our case, discursive) activities,
of the political or socio-psychological aims or functions of these activities, and
of (linguistic) means designed to help realise these aims’ (Wodak et al., 2003, p.
34). For example, according to Wodak (2006, p. 136), a justification of one’s
activities during war (e.g. ‘doing one’s duty’) is a linguistic strategy that serves the
purpose of upholding one’s self-image and presenting oneself favourable to an
audience. Strategies are in turn realized by particular linguistic means, for example,
giving one’s own group a particular name (and another to ‘other’ group), using
comparative adjectives, and so on.
In the analyzed transcripts, one of the main functions of social representation
of the actors serves as an affirmation of the ideology by contrasting it to the
opposing ideology. It is precisely for these reasons that we consider Hall’s
‘discourse of difference’ as the most effective method to think through binary
positions. Hall (1989) understands ‘discourses of difference’ (p. 913) as those
that make a distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Any group, to be identified as a
group, must be differentiated from the Others – both internal and external. Any
kind of identity, as Hall further suggests, is primarily defined as a difference from
the Others. The fact that meanings of ‘us’ and ‘them’, implying identification with
and differentiation from, are not ontologically given, but ideologically constructed
becomes even clearer through linguistic analysis. Still, because it appears so
natural, this ‘us’ and ‘them’ dichotomy is rarely questioned. The construction of
identity is a process of differentiation, a description of one’s own group and a
differentiation from the others (Wodak, 1996). This means that the identities of
social actors in the texts are mostly constructed and defined as members of
groups, and the emphasis is placed on representing the Others as different,
deviant or even as a threat.
We analyzed the choice of keywords of the informants and compared
them with groups of typical keywords. It is widely accepted that the choice of the
words used by elites is by no means arbitrary. This particular choice is not only
the elites’ own creation, but is connected to their own society. Trew (1979) and
Teo (2000) in their studies of lexical choice and ideologies concluded that all
perceptions which are embodied in lexicalization, involve ideologies.
Croatian (patriotic and nationalistic) journalism
As for the case in Croatia, during the 1990s there was a dominant professional
ideology of a so-called “patriotic journalism” (Curgus, 1999, p. 128). The
characteristic of Croatian mainstream journalism at the time was a “blood-and-
soil” superiority, “my-country-right-or-wrong” version and “us-versus-them” mentality.
An important phenomenon was then the nationalization, popularization of the
public sphere. Media systems were centralized and any type of information was
distributed according to the principle of national loyalty. Nationalistic journalism
expressed obedience to authority, it established loyalty towards the state power
and nationalistic elite, it conformed to conventions and the dominant common
sense, and it remained loyal to the mainstream nationalistic principle (Billing,
1995). For example, articles were full of the “glorious history” to substantiate the
myth of historical superiority of Croatian nation in relation to the others and
forge the sense of nationalism and patriotism (Thompson, 1995; Skopljanac
Brunner et al., 2000). Croatian reporters in mainstream media represented the
Serbs and the Bosniaks as the unacceptable “others”, as the nation of an alien
culture and civilization (Zakosek, 1999). They did not report or inform; their sole
function was to validate the politics of the govern  ing party (ibid.).
The analysis of mainstream Croatian and Serbian journalisms in 2005 has
showed how both of them reproduce a particular kind of nationalism, albeit a more
hidden one (Erjavec & Volcic 2006). They both also share the portrayal of the
Bosniaks that continue to be represented as “the Other” in the mainstream media.
4. Data collection
Our research design included 25 problem-centered, qualitative interviews
with Croatian journalists aged 24-50. During the interview, we asked them to
give their understanding of the role of Croatia during the wars in BIH and
especially to reflect upon the responsibility of Croatia for war crimes against
Bosniaks (1992-1995). For our research analysis, these 25 journalists were carefully
chosen as representing the national, mainstream journalism voices. These journalists
work for different Croatian media that more or less support the official governmental
policies, and have the largest circulations among the non-tabloid media (Malovic,
2004, p. 128-131): from daily newspapers Vecernji list (5), and Slobodna dalmacija
(5); and from national radio and television Hrvatski radio (5), Hrvatska televizija
(5), and five journalists from national news agency Hina, that continues to be
one of the main information sources for majority of media.
None of the interviewed journalists had participated in the wars in the
former Yugoslavia (1991-1995). The empirical data for this article then are based
on in-depth, semi-structured individual interviews conducted in different regions
of Croatia in the summer and fall of 2006. All interviews were conducted in the
Croatian language by both researchers 5  . Although the interviews contained
specific questions, the interviewees’ responses sometimes called for improvisation.
The interviews were transcribed verbatim by both researchers and were analyzed
in terms of recurring narratives and themes. We used this technique of research in
order to gather data on our informants’ perceptions beyond the official declaration
of leaders, or as reported in the media, and thus offer more in-depth information
on their perceptions than surveys would generally reveal. To ensure the respondents’
anonymity, we labelled our informants by using letters.
territory Herceg-Bosna (McDonald,
2002, p. 241).
5 Both researchers come from the
region of former Yugoslavia and they
both speak and read Serbian and
Croatian languages. There were no
signif icant problems with the
translations.
5. Croatian crime war discourses
Analysed transcripts of in-depth interviews show four rexontextualization
strategies, divided into four sub-chapters.
1. ‘We had to fight against Islamic terrorism.’
The comparison of the propositions of the in-depth interviews’ transcripts
enables us to discover that the proposition, ‘We had to fight against Islamic
terrorism’, is adopted by more than a half of all the interviews (13). Croatian
journalists have not just used the strategy of relativism, with which they would
enumerate crimes of other nations, or use clichés that relativize the past (‘Every
war is horrible’.) (Wodak, 2006, p. 137), but have appropriated G. W. Bush’s ‘war
on terrorism’ discourse according to their own socio-historical context without
regret. Most of the research on G.W. Bush’s discourse after September 11 (e.g.
Chomsky, 2001; Johnson, 2002; Kellner, 2002, 2003; Bailey & Chermak, 2003;
Graham et al., 2004; Höijer et al., 2004; Ottosen, 2004) agrees that the discourse
contains the following elements: the war has been proclaimed between good
and evil; the evil Other is Islamic terrorism, personified by bin Laden; and the
West has to unite in a war against terrorism to defend its civilization and its
freedom. By recontextualizing Bush’s discourse into the former Yugoslav context
the journalists were drawing an analogy between the war against Bosniaks and
the USA war against terrorism to make sense of and legitimize and justify the
Croatian war against Muslims in BiH and massacres of Bosniak civilians. For
example, here is a typical statement:
Interviewer: What is your opinion about the war crimes committed by the Croatian armed
forces against the Bosniaks in BiH?
Informant M: I think that Croatia had to fight against Islamic terrorists like America or the
West do...
Interviewer: Were the Bosniaks who were killed – also terrorists?
Informant M: It is well-known that most of the Bosniaks are Islamic fundamentalists.
Journalists use the same binary opposition as Bush regarding two groups:
‘us’ (‘good/terrorists’ victims/Croats’) versus ‘them’ (‘Islamic terrorists/evil/Bosniaks’).
They associate themselves with ‘the terrorists’ victims’, i.e. victims of war in BiH
and completely identify with the Croatian political leadership and army (indicated
through frequent use of ‘we’, what ‘we had to fight’, while describing how terrorism
in BiH ‘forced’ the Croatian army to attack BiH). ‘The Other’ is portrayed as
Muslims in general, Muslims in BiH, Islamic terrorists, Mujahedin fighters and Al-
Qaida. Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) are equated with Islamic terrorists. Thus, the
journalists reproduce Bush’s binary discourse except in that they appropriate it
according to their own context: while they position themselves as the good
ones, and ‘the victims’ of their own ‘local’ Muslim perpetrators, at the same time
they accuse them of being connected with ‘global’ Islamic terrorists. The statements
employed in this kind of argumentation rely on common-sense language such
as ‘everybody knows’ or ‘we all know’ to further naturalize this polarization. Our
journalists also use the modal verb ‘have to’ to connote meaning that Croats had
no other choice than to defend themselves and kill Bosniaks. Journalists name
BiH as ‘the Balkan base of terrorism’ and the war against Bosniaks as ‘war on
terrorism’. For example:
Al Qaeda cells were established in Bosnia and Herzegovina at the beginning of the
1990s, and their creator is Ayman Az Zawahiri…Let me explain… Bosniaks answered
Zawahiri’s calls and started to organize bases of terrorism in which the plans for attacking
the Western countries are being plotted. BiH was the Balkan base of terrorism. When the
Croats went to war in Bosnia, they went to war on terrorism. (Informant V)
The Bush’s ‘war on terrorism’ includes many essentialist stereotypes about
Islam and violent Muslims (see Karim, 2002). Similarly, most of our journalists
recycle these stereotypes of Muslims as terrorists. Overall, this stereotypical image
is explained by global political factor, but it relies on essentialist and simplistic
biological evidence: ‘terrorism is in the Muslims’ blood’:
You should understand... everybody knows that the Muslims are terrorists... It is in their
blood. (Informant J)
2. ‘To Kill Bosniak civilians was a necessary evil just like in Iraq.’
A similar justification strategy, i.e. a comparison between one’s own politics
and military with others, exists in a different, more cotemporary case of global
conflicts. It is still primarily a terrorism discourse, nevertheless, some journalists
did not compare the Croatian-Bosnian war with the US war on terror. Instead
they drew an analogy with the USA-Iraq war and claimed that ‘killing Bosniak
civilians was a necessary evil just like … what’s going on in Iraq today’. The
journalists used the same binary opposition as the USA government regarding
two groups: ‘us’ (‘good/terrorists’ victims/Croats’) vs. ‘them’ (‘terrorists/evil/Islamic
terrorists’). They were explicit about equating the ‘Croatian Army’ with the ‘the
USA Army’ and ‘Iraqi rebels’ with ‘Islamic terrorists’. They borrowed an ‘Iraqi war’
(see Nohrstedt & Ottosen, 2005) which they appropriated according to their
own context to make sense of and legitimize the Croatian war against Muslims
in BiH and massacres of Bosniaks civilians. According to Nohrstedt & Ottosen
(2005), an ‘Iraqi war discourse’ features a belief that civilian casualties are a
necessary evil, i.e. death of innocent Iraqi civilians is a fair price to pay for attacks
against Iraqi rebels. Journalists similarly justified the killings by arguing that
Bosniak civilians had been ruthlessly manipulated by Islamic terrorists. The latter
had, according to our informants, set their bases and placed their weapons in
populated areas, although they had known that any attack of Croatian armed
forces on their bases would have led to heavy casualties among innocent civilians.
For example:
Interviewer: What is your opinion on the war crimes committed by the Croatian armed
forces against the Bosniaks in BiH?
Informant O: I regret civilian casualties, but dead Bosniak civilians were a necessary evil
in that war.
Interviewer: Can you explain what you think?
Informant O: Well, the problem was that they were manipulated by the terrorists, who hide
among civilians and were shooting from civilian positions … and our people could not
destroy Islamic terrorists and avoid civilian casualties at the same time.
Interviewer: Why had the Croatian Army not stopped attacking the Bosniaks?
Journalists O: Look … there is a similar case in Iraq these days. The USA military has not
stopped the attacks just because Iraqi rebels set its bases and weapons amid Iraqi civilians.
Besides, Bosniaks and Iraqi are not real civilians; they protect and support Islamic terrorists.
The Croats would never do it…
This example, like the case of an Iraqi war discourse (ibid.), also demonstrates
that there is a differentiation of civilians between ‘completely innocent Croatian
civilians’ and ‘not real Bosniak (Iraqi) civilians’ who support Islamic terrorists. In
contrast to recontextualisation of ‘war on terrorism’, recontextualisation of an
‘Iraqi war discourse’ includes regret and a clear distinction between terrorists and
Bosniak civilians.
3. ‘We had to defend Europe against Islam.’
The next justification strategy was to fight for Europe. Our informants claimed
that ‘they probably had to kill Bosniaks to defend Europe against Islam’. They not
only “seek to provide a (pseudo-)rational causal explanation for the war crimes”
(Wodak, 2006, p. 137), but they appropriate the ‘European discourse’ to their own
political-historical context to make sense of and legitimize and justify the Croatian
war against Muslims in BiH and massacres of Bosniaks civilians. Most of the research
on ‘European discourse’ (e.g. Wintle, 1996; Puntcher Riekmann, 1997; Mastnak, 1998;
Spohn & Triandafyllidou, 2003; Velikonja, 2005) agrees that the Eurocentristic discourse
contains the following elements: obsessive repetition of ‘Europe’, ‘European’ without
explanation as to what these attributes were supposed to mean; anything that is of
any value is ‘European’ (e.g. European trends, way of life, culture, civilization, quality,
values, prosperity, dynamics) and at the same time, all things that are obsolete,
problematic, violent and all that is out, stand for the other side – the Balkans, the East,
the communist past the Muslims and so on; and the terms ‘European Union’ and
‘Europe’ are frequently used interchangeable. Thus, Europe has become a kind of a
magic formula, a moral concept, a synonym of the new meaning. Our journalists
also used the modal verb ‘have to’ to connote meaning, that Croatians had had no
other choice but to kill Bosniaks in order to protect Europe.
An example from the interview depicts the above:
Interviewer: Why did the Croatian Army kill Bosniaks during the war?
Informant L: In a way… we had to fight to defend Europe.
Interviewer: Against what?
Informant L: Well, to prevent a creation of an Islamic state in Europe.
The journalists conveyed the image of Croatia protecting the West from
barbarous East, with the Muslims trying to set up an Islamic State and invade
Europe, in a manner reminiscent of the Ottoman invasion. The journalists also
compared the Bosniaks to ‘Turkish occupiers’. They accused the Bosniaks of
trying to take over the Balkans and Europe. The picture of Croatia standing on
the border between East and West was a powerful image. For example:
Muslim’s leaders had plans to make Sarajevo a European Islamic capital, housing some
15 million European Muslims. We had to prevent this. (Informant S)
The journalists represented Bosniaks or BiH as non-European and with that
implicitly include its own nation and nation-state as belonging to Europe. For example:
Muslim government was transforming Bosnia and Herzegovina into the first Islamic republic
of Europe. We had to prevent it, because Islam has never been a part of Europe. … It is
obvious, that Muslims in BiH were in Europe’s way because it did not react.
The journalists reduced all Muslims to a monolithic and irrationally violent
‘Other’, and recycled Western stereotypes (see Karim, 1997; Said, 1978, 1997)
about Muslims and Islam. Karim (1997) in particular argues that violence, lust,
and barbarism seem to be the primary western images associated with ‘Islam’ and
he cautions against drawing hurried conclusions about the nature of Islam.
Bosniaks become framed as having a different way of life than the Croats and
other Europeans. The journalists blame the Bosniaks in general for trying to
transform and change ‘our European way of life.’ They use the words ‘Muslims’,
‘Bosniaks’, ‘Turkish occupiers’ synonymously, just as ‘Croats’ is interchangeable
with ‘Europeans’. By using strategy of cultural differentiation journalists also seek
to construct a meaning that exists as a homogeneous one, expressing a bounded
and a unified European cultural way of life and at the same time again deny any
structural discrepancies between them and other Europeans. The journalists regularly
used the notion of ‘our’ Europe/our European way of life/world in order to include
themselves and their Croatian imagined community in the European ‘we’-group.
Muslims tried to infiltrate their Islamic habits here, and changed our European way of
life. (Informant U), Bosniaks are known for their regression, orientalism, corporeality,
intimacy, and for being rural, uncivil, uncivilized, and funny (Informant F) … they do not
share the European habits. (Informant L) … they do not share common European values.
(Informant P) … they do not have free speech, democracy or freedom of religion. (Informant
H) … they do not listen Western music and favour Arab-sounding music (Informant K)
The journalists emphasized the cultural differences – grounded in the cultural
Otherness of Muslims (including a way of life, habits, customs and manners).
Many scholars (Barker, 1981; Balibar & Wallerstein, 1991; Miles, 1994) define
this kind of a cultural differentiation as a kind of ‘differentialist racism’, ‘cultural
racism’, or ‘culturalist racism’.
They represented their own religion as a peaceful one. On the other hand,
Islam is portrayed as aggressive and violent. For example,
from Bosnia, peace-loving Catholics were being expelled … Islamists were trying hard to
create and violently push for Muslim laws within the Christian Europe. (Informant P)
4. ‘We had to defend our property and market .’
Lastly, journalists recontextualized neo-liberal discourse and argued that
‘they had to defend their property and market’. Most of the research on neo-
liberal discourse (e.g. Boreus, 1997; Fairclough, 2000a, 2000b; Bourdieu &
Wacquant, 2001; Brenner & Theodore, 2002; Tickell & Peck, 2006) agree that
this discourse includes a narrative of progress: the ‘globalised’ world offers
unprecedented opportunities for ‘growth’ through intensified ‘competition’,
‘privatisation’, ‘financial and labour market deregulation’, ‘trade liberalisation’, but
requiring unfettered ‘free trade’ and the dismantling of ‘state bureaucracy’ and
‘unaffordable welfare programmers’, ‘flexibility of labour’, ‘transparency’,
‘modernization’ and so forth. Here is a statement from one of the interviews:
Interviewer: What is your opinion on the war crimes committed by the Croatian armed
forces against the Bosniaks in BiH?
Informant E: Let me explain ... Well ... in the former Yugoslavia, the Croatian economy
invested too much in BiH to stand still whilst Bosniaks were stealing its property ...
Indeed, we had to defend our property and market.
Interviewer: Why did the Croatian Army kill Bosniaks?
Informant E: They were extremists, who wanted to live on other people’s account … after
all, they were against the reforms of the entire social system. They wanted to live forever
in Communism and to retain their privileges. We, the Croats, literally supported them; all
our tourism revenues were meant and have gone for the undeveloped. And then, they
wanted to take away our property and keep it for themselves. … It is obvious that Bosniaks
are against progress. Modern world is about privatisation, financial and labour market
deregulation, trade liberalisation, welfare cutbacks, the knowledge-based economy,
integration into global processes, etc., and not to invest into projects that one knows
beforehand they will be unprofitable on behalf of social peace, protection of idlers, and
collective responsibility ... Indeed, it is primarily about individual responsibility for one’s
own work, which Bosniaks lack.
This example shows how journalists used neo-liberal discourse and
appropriated it according to their own political-historical context to make sense
of, legitimize and justify the Croatian war against Bosniaks in BiH and massacres
of Bosniak civilians. They used an economic argument: ‘we had to defend our
property and market’ to justify and legitimize war against Bosniaks and massacres
of Bosniaks civilians. In this line they used neo-liberal phrases, such as ‘privatisation’,
‘financial and labour market deregulation’, ‘trade liberalisation’, ‘welfare cutbacks’,
‘the knowledge-based economy’, ‘integration into global processes’ to present
Croatia as a part of the economically developing capitalist world in contrast to
all Bosniaks, who are undeveloped, lazy, exploiters, individually irresponsible, and
extremists, and who still adore Communism. The journalists emphasize that neo-
liberal development is inevitable in a modern world which requires that Croatia’s
development is based on the neo-liberal positions. This belief was expressed
with a phrase ‘the modern world requires that we’ and a lack of responsible
social agents. Even in this case, our journalists used a modal verb ‘to have to’ to
connote a meaning that Croatians had had no choice but to kill Bosniaks. Thus,
they used a neo-liberal discourse and represented neo-liberalism as a social
inevitability to justify Croatian war crimes committed in BiH.
6. Conclusion
Interviewed journalists used and borrowed from four modern and extended
discourses to justify and legitimize the war against Bosniaks and massacres of
Bosniaks civilians. What is particularly interesting here is that they did not resort
to an old (and in the former Yugoslavia popularly accepted justification) that
massacres of Bosniaks had been committed by more or less crazy individuals,
political renegades, criminals, or bandits (Magas & Zanic, 2001). The journalists
accepted that the aforementioned had been planned by the Croatian government,
however, they justified and legitimized it by appropriating already established
modern discourses, such as ‘war on terrorism’, ‘Iraqi war’, ‘European’ and neo-
liberal discourses. They also completely identified with the Croatian political
leadership and army (indicated through frequent use of ‘we’, what ‘we had to
fight’, while describing how Bosniaks ‘forced’ the Croatian army to attack BiH).
Although some interviewees regretted that war crimes had been committed, they
also argued that they had been inevitable.
The research also shows a transformation of the prevailing Croatian
discourses in the last ten to fifteen years. For example, despite the country’s
troublesome relationship with the US administration the prevailing Croatian
discourse has been transformed after 9/11 to demonstrate a shared commonality
of interests with its one-time assailant. Another example of a radical change in
discourse is an attitude towards Europe. Croatian intellectuals and mainstream media
of the early 1990s labelled Europe as ‘a whore’, a synonym for a moral and emotional
corruption (more in Buden, 2002). Today, Europe and Europeaness have become a
magic formula, and a moral concept. A change from Communism to neo-liberalism,
however, demonstrates the most rapid ideological and social leap.
7. References
Bailey, Y. F. & Chermak, S. (2003). Introduction. In S. Chermak, F.Y. Bailey &
M. Brown (Eds.), Media Representation of September 11 (pp 1-14). Wesport,
Praeger.
Balibar, E. & Wallerstein, I. (1991). Race, Nation, Class. Les Identites Ambigues,
Paris: Editions La Decouverte.
Barker, M. (1981). The New Racism. London: Junction Books.
Bilandzic, D. (2006). Povijest izbliza – memoarski zapisi 1945-2005. Zagreb:
Prometej Zagreb.
Boreus, K. (1997). The shift to the right: Neo-liberalism in argumentation
and language in the Swedish public debate since 1969. European Journal of
Political Research, 31, 257-286.
Bourdieu, P. (1977). Outline of a Theory of Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Bourdieu, P. & Wacquant, L. (2001). NewLiberalSpeak: notes on the new
planetary vulgate. Radical Philosophy, 105, 2-5.
Brenner, N. & Theodore, N. (Eds.) (2002). Spaces of neoliberalism. Oxford:
Blackwell.
Brown, G. & Yule, G. (1983). Discourse analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Buden, B. (2002). Kaptolski kolodvor. Beograd: CZSU.
Chomsky, N. (2001). 9-11. New York: Seven Seals Press.
Curgus, V. K. (1999). Oblaèenje novena. In N. Skopljanac-Brunner, A. Hod•iæ
& B. Kritoviæ (Eds.), Mediji i rat (pp. 121-137). Beograd: Mediji.
Divjak, J. (2001). The First Phase, 1992-1992. In B. Magas and I. Zanic (Eds.),
The War in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina 1991-1995 (pp. 136-7). London:
Frank Cass.
Erjavec, K. (2002). September 11. Media Construction of Risk Discourse:
Critical Discourse Analysis. MediaJournal, 26, 19-31.
Erjavec, K. & Volcic, Z (2006). Mapping the notion of “terrorism” in Serbian
and Croatian newspapers. Journal of Communication Inquiry, 30, 1-21.
Fairclough, N. (1992). Discourse and Social Change. Cambridge: Polity Press.
— (1995). Critical Discourse Analysis, London: Longman.
— (2000a). New Labour, New Language. London: Routledge.
— (2000b). Language and neo-liberalism. Discourse & Society, 11, 147-178.
— (2003) Analysing discourse: Textual analysis for social research. London:
Routledge.
Galtung, J. (2002). Conflicts: The Yugoslavia Conflict 1991/1995. In J. Galtung,
C. G. Jaconsen & K. F. Brand-Jacobsen (Eds.), Searching for Peace: The Road
to Transcend (pp. 235-237). London: Pluto Press.
Graham, P., Keenan, T. & Down, A.-M. (2004). A call to arms at the end of
history: a discourse-historical analysis of George W. Bush’s declaration of war
on terror. Discourse & Society, 15, 199-222.
Hall, S. (1989). Ideologie, Kultur, Medien: Neue Rechte, Rassismus. Hamburg:
Argument.
Höijer, B., Nohrdtedt, S. A. & Ottesen, R. (2004). Introduction. In S. A. Nohrstedt
& R. Ottesen (Eds.), U.S. and the Others (pp. 7-22). Götenborg: Nordicom.
Kajzer, R. (2006, 6 July). Tuman spet buri duhove, Delo, 4.
Karim, K. H. (1997). The Historical Resilience of Primary Stereotypes: Core
Images of the Muslim Other. In S. H. Riggins (ed.) The Language and Politics
of Exclusion: Others in Discourse (pp. 153-182). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
— (2002). Making sense of the ‘Islamic peril’: Journalism as cultural practice.
In B. Zelizer & S. Allan (Eds.) Journalism after September 11 (pp. 101-116).
London and New York: Routledge.
Kellner, D. (2002). September 11, Social Theory and Democratic Politics. Theory,
Culture & Society, 2, 147-159.
— (2003). From 9/11 to Terror War: Dangers of the Bush Legacy. Lanham,
Md.: Rowman and Littlefield.
Lampe, J. (1996). Yugoslavia as History: Twice There was a Country. Cambridge:
University Press.
Malovic, S. (2004). Croatia. In B. Petkovic (ed.), Media ownership and its
impact on media independence and pluralism (pp. 119-140). Ljubljana: Peace
Institute.
MacDonald, D. B. (2002). Balkan Holocausts? Manchester: Manchester
University Press.
Mastnak, T. (1998). Evropa med evolucijo in evtanazijo. Ljubljana: Studia
humanitas-Aples.
Miles, R. (1994). Explaining Racism in Contemporary Europe. In A. Rattansi &
S. Westwood (Eds.), Racism, Modernity & Identity (pp. 189-221). Cambridge:
Polity Press.
Nohrstedt, S. A. / Ottosen, R. (Eds.) (2005).  Globar War-Local Views. Göteborg:
Nordicom.
Kurspahic, K. (2003). Prime time crime: Balkan media in war and peace.
Washigton: United States Institute of Peace.
Ottosen, R. (2004). Mr. President: “The Enemy is Closer than You Might
Think”. In S. A. Nohrstedt & R. Ottesen (Eds.), U.S. and the Others (pp. 107-
129). Götenborg: Nordicom.
Puntscher Riekmann, S. (1997). The Myth of European Union. In G. Hosking
& G. Schopflin (Eds.), Myths and Nationhood (pp. 60-71). London: Hurst &
Company and University of London.
Razsa, M. & Lindstrom, N. (2004). Balkan Is Beautiful: Balkanism in the Political
Discourse of Tudjman’s Croatia. East European Politics and Society, 18, 628-
650.
Said, E. W. (1978). Orientalism. New York: Pantheon.
— (1997). Covering Islam. New York: Vintage Books.
Samary, C. (1995). Yugoslavia Dismembered. New York: Monthly Review pres.
Sampson, S. (2003). From Reconciliation to Coexistence. Public Culture, 15,
181-186.
Silber, L. & Little, A. (1995). The Death of Yugoslavia. London: Peguin.
Skopljanac Brunner, N., Gredelj, S., Hodzic, A. & Kristofic, B. (Eds.). (2000).
Media & war. Belgrad: Agency Argument.
Spohn, W. & Triandafyllidou, A. (Eds.). (2003). Europeanisation: National
Identity and Migration: Changes in Boundary Constructions between Western
and Eastern Europe. London: Routledge.
Statistics Bulletin (1991). Sarajevo: Republic’s Bureau for Statistics.
Teo, P. (2000). Racism in the news: a Critical Discourse Analysis of news
reporting in two Australian newspapers. Discourse & Society, 11, 7-49.
Tickell, A. & Peck, J. (2006). Making global rules: globalisation or
neoliberalisation?. Retrieved September 30, 2006, from www.geocities.com/
pw.graham/indcindex.html.
Todorova, M. (1997). Imagining the Balkans. New York, Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Thompson, M. (1995). Proizvodnja rata: Mediji u Srbiji, Hrvatskoj i Bosni i
Hercegovini. Beograd: Medija centar Radio B-92.
Trew, T. (1979). What the papers say: Linguistic variation and ideological
difference. In R. Fowler, R. Hodge, G. Kress and T. Trew (Eds.) Language and
Control (pp. 214-245). London: Routledge and Keagen Paul.
Van Dijk, A. T. (1988). News as discourse, Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Verdery, K. and Burawoy, J. M. 1999 Uncertain Transition: Ethnographies of
Change in the Postsocialist World, Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield.
Volcic, Z. (2006). Blaming the Media: Serbian narratives of national(ist) identity.
Journal of Media & Cultural Studies, 20, 313 – 330.
Wilson, R. (2001). The Politics of Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wintle, M. (ed). (1996). Culture and Identity in Europe: Perception of
Divergence and Unity in Past and Present.  Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd.
Wodak, R. (1996). The Genesis of Racist Discourse in Austria. In C.R. Caldas-
Coulthard & M. Coulthard (Eds), Texts and Practice: Readings in Critical
Discourse Analysis (pp. 107-128). London: Routledge.
— (2006). History in the making/The making of history. Journal of Language
and Politics, 5, 125-154.
Wodak, R., de Cillia, R., Reisigl, M. & Liebhart, K. (1999). The discursive
construction of national identity.  Edinburgh: Edinburgh University press Ltd.
Woodward, S. L. (1995). Balkan Tragedy. Chaos and Dissolution After the
Cold War. Washington. D.C: The Brookings Institution.
Zakosek, N. (1999). Legitimacija rata: Politièka konstrukcija nove zbilje. In N.
Skopljanac-Brunner, A. Hod•iæ & B. Kritofiæ (Eds.), Mediji i rat (pp. 15-
39). Beograd: Mediji.
